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1 Introduction
The two classic papers in the theory of strategic interaction among firms are those
by Cournot (1838) and Bertrand (1883). The first one proposes quantities as the
strategy variable while the latter one suggests prices. Since then it is well known
that quantities induce a lower degree of competition. So if firms are free to choose
their strategy variable, they would prefer quantities rather than prices. This result
was first confirmed by Singh and Vives (1984) and Cheng (1985) in a deterministic
two-stage game in which duopolistic firms first choose their strategy variable and
compete afterwards. They show that quantities are a dominant action for both
firms.1
However, a deterministic model might not be fully appropriate because firms
often face uncertainty at the time the strategy variable has to be chosen. For exam-
ple, firms may be uncertain about the size of the market or about the distribution
of consumers’ reservation prices. Our analysis incorporates this aspect by intro-
ducing uncertainty via shocks that affect the slope and the intercept of the demand
curve. In our set-up, we show that the dominance of quantities no longer holds
since a higher amount of uncertainty lowers firms’ profits under quantity com-
petition and favors prices. So if uncertainty is high compared to the degree of
substitutability, it is a dominant strategy for each firm to set a price. Moreover,
we find that for an intermediate amount of uncertainty the unique equilibrium
outcome is that one firm selects a price and the other one a quantity.
Our analysis employs the same game structure as Singh and Vives (1984) and
Cheng (1985), namely firms first select their strategy variable independently of
each other and then compete. Yet, while these authors analyze the deterministic
case, we consider stochastic demand. We set out by developing the main insights
in the simplest possible framework. Specifically, we consider a linear demand sys-
tem where a shock affects the slope of the demand curves. We demonstrate that
there is a relative advantage of price setting due to uncertainty. The reason is that a
firm’s choice of its strategy variable determines how the shock affects its expected
profit. If a firm fixes its price, the quantity responds to the shock in a more fa-
vorable way than the price would respond if it fixed the quantity instead. This
effect increases in the size of the shock. On the other hand, the relative advantage
1Tanaka (2001) analyzes a more general model with n firms and finds that all firms selecting
quantities is a subgame perfect equilibrium. Recently, Tasnadi (2006) showed for the case with
homogeneous goods and n firms that the only equilibrium is that all firms select quantities if they
are not capacity constrained.
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of quantities is that they induce a smaller degree of competition and this becomes
more pronounced the larger the degree of substitutability. Thus, the degree of sub-
stitutability and the degree of uncertainty have countervailing effects on variable
choice. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome under uncertainty
is unique. Firms select prices as their strategic variable if uncertainty is high rela-
tive to the degree of substitutability and select quantities if the reverse holds true.
Moreover, for every degree of substitutability there exists an intermediate range of
uncertainty in which both effects balance each other and the unique equilibrium
outcome involves one firm setting a price and the other one choosing a quantity.2
We extend our analysis by introducing a shock to the intercept that might be
correlated with the shock to the slope. The same line of reasoning applies. How-
ever, now it is the covariance that in addition to the variance of the slope shock
drives firms’ choice of strategy variables. If the covariance is positive and high
relative to the degree of substitutability, both firms select prices rather than quanti-
ties and vice versa. The “hybrid” outcome in which firms choose different strategy
variables arises only for sufficiently high degrees of substitutability.
There are only few papers that deal with the choice of prices versus quantities
in a stochastic environment. Weitzman (1974) analyzes the incentives of a social
planner to regulate prices or quantities in the presence of demand uncertainty.
Reis (2006) considers the choice of a monopolist under general demand conditions.
The only paper that explicitly analyzes this choice in an oligopolistic setting is
Klemperer and Meyer (1986). They consider a one-shot duopoly game in which
a firm chooses the strategy variable and its magnitude at the same time. As the
game has a simultaneous structure, firms do not choose the mode of competition.
Instead, each firm acts as a monopolist given its expected residual demand curve.
Therefore in their framework the relative advantage of quantities is not present.
Our analysis shows that there is a trade-off between uncertainty and the degree of
competition and derives conditions under which either strategy variable’s relative
advantage dominates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. In
Section 3 we solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium in case of a shock affect-
ing the slope. In Section 4 we extend the model by incorporating a shock to the
2That the choice of strategy variables varies across firms seems to be in line with empirical
research. For example, Aiginger (1999) asked managers of 930 manufacturing firm in Austria if
they select prices or quantities as their decision variable. Roughly, 2/3 charge prices and 1/3 set
quantities.
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intercept. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a duopolywith differentiated products. Assume that firms face the linear
inverse demand system
pi = α− β
θ
qi − γ
θ
qj, (1)
pj = α− β
θ
qj − γ
θ
qi, (2)
with α > 0 and β > γ ≥ 0.3 When γ → β, products become perfect substitutes,
whereas with γ = 0 they are independent. θ is a random variable with E[θ] = 1
and Var(θ) = σ2θ > 0. We denote E[
1
θ
] by z. By Jensen’s inequality, z > 1 and
increases in σ2θ . To avoid unnecessary complications we require the support of θ to
be sufficiently small such that no equilibria emerge in which a price setting firm
sells a negative quantity or a quantity setting firm receives a negative price. We
further assume that firms have zero marginal costs.4
Competition between firms takes the form of a two-stage game. In stage 1
firms simultaneously and irrevocably choose their strategy variables. Each firm
observes the other firm’s choice and competes in stage 2 contingent on the chosen
strategy variables. Thereafter the shock realizes, markets clear, and profits accrue.
We solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction.
3 Solution to the Model
3.1 The Second Stage
First, suppose that both firms set prices as their strategy variable. Solving equa-
tions (1) and (2) for qi and qj gives firm i’s demand curve, qi =
θ(α(β−γ)−βpi+γpj)
β2−γ2 . As
E[θ] = 1, firm i thus solves
max
pi
pi
(
α(β − γ)− βpi + γpj
β2 − γ2
)
.
3The demand system and the way in which the shock affects the slopes of the inverse demand
curves is the same as in Klemperer and Meyer (1986).
4As Singh and Vives (1984) show, the analysis would not change if firms faced positive constant
marginal costs c because this would only lower the effective intercept from α to α− c.
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Computing the solution to the maximization problems of firm i and j yields equi-
librium prices of
pi = pj =
(β − γ)α
2β − γ .
Therefore each firm’s expected profit is equal to
Πpp =
α2(β − γ)β
(β + γ)(2β − γ)2 .
Next, suppose that both firms set quantities as their strategy variable. Since
E[1
θ
] = z, firm i solves
max
qi
qi(α− z(βqi + γqj)).
Computing the solution to the maximization problem of both firms yields equilib-
rium quantities of
qi = qj =
α
z(2β + γ)
and an expected profit of
Πqq =
α2β
z(2β + γ)2
for each firm.
Lastly, if firm i sets a price while firm j sets a quantity, the demand curve of
firm i is qi =
αθ−θpi−γqj
β
and the inverse demand curve of firm j is pj =
(αθ−qj(β+γ))(β−γ)
βθ
+γpi
β
. Computing the profit functions, maximizing and solving for the equilibrium
yields a price of
pi =
α2(β − γ)(2z(β + γ)− γ)
4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2
and a quantity of
qj =
α(2β − γ)
4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2 .
The expected profit of the price setting firm is
Πpq =
(β − γ)2(2zα2(β + γ)− γ)2
(4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2)2β ,
while the expected profit of the quantity setting firm is
Πqp =
zα2(β2 − γ2)(2β − γ)2
(4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2)2β .
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Before we continue with the analysis we introduce some notation.5 Condi-
tional on firm j setting a quantity the difference in profits of firm i between setting
a price and setting a quantity is defined as
∆Πq(γ, z) := Πpq − Πqq.
If firm j sets a price this difference is defined as
∆Πp(γ, z) := Πpp − Πqp.
3.2 The First Stage
As spelled out before, if the game is deterministic (σ2θ = 0) it is the dominant strat-
egy for firms to set quantities in the first stage since they induce a lower degree of
competition.6 The following Lemma shows that this is no longer true under un-
certainty.
Lemma 1
For every γ ∈ (0, β) there exists a unique z, labeled zq(γ), such that
∆Πq(γ, z)

>
=
<
 0 if z

>
=
<
 zq(γ),
and there exists a unique z, labeled zp(γ), such that
∆Πp(γ, z)

>
=
<
 0 if z

>
=
<
 zp(γ).
zq(γ) and zp(γ) are strictly increasing with limγ→0 zq(γ) = limγ→0 zp(γ) = 1 and
zp(γ) > zq(γ) for γ ∈ (0, β).
Proof. See Appendix.
5In the following analysis we hold α and β fixed and consider only changes in γ and z to point
out the tension between the degree of substitutability and the amount of uncertainty.
6This is easy to check since for all γ ∈ (0, β),∆Πq(γ, 1) < 0 and∆Πp(γ, 1) < 0.
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Figure 1: Example with quantity setting
The result that zq(γ) and zp(γ) are strictly increasing highlights the trade-off
between uncertainty and the degree of substitutability. While a higher amount
of risk (higher z) favors price setting, a higher degree of substitutability (higher
γ) favors quantity setting. An increase in the degree of substitutability makes the
market more competitive. Since quantities are the less aggressive strategy variable,
such an increase makes quantity setting more attractive relative to price setting.
The opposite holds true concerning uncertainty. Let us explain this in more detail.
First look at the case in which both firms select quantities. As can be seen from
the demand system, the shock enters the inverse demand function in a non-linear
way. The bigger the variance σ2θ of the shock, the larger is z. As a consequence the
expected price is decreasing in z. This is illustrated in an example in Figure 1.
Here θ can take on two values, either θ1 = 12 or θ2 =
3
2
with equal probability.
Thus, E[θ] = 1 and z = 4
3
> 1. The consequence is that 1
2
(
p?i (θ1) + p
?
i (θ2)
)
<
p?i (E[θ]). As is obvious, the price decrease following a bad shock (AB in Figure
1) is larger than the price increase following a good shock of same size (BC in
Figure 1). Thus, as is evident in Πqq, firms’ profits in the quantity setting case are
decreasing in the size of the shock. Next, consider the case in which both firms
select prices. The expression for Πpp shows that firms’ expected profits are not
affected by the size of the shock. The reason is that the shock enters the demand
equation in a linear way and therefore cancels out in expectation. Lastly, in the
hybrid case the shock affects the demand of the price setting firm linearly but it
enters the inverse demand for the quantity setting firm non-linearly. Thus, the
larger is σ2θ , the higher is the expected price-decrease that the quantity setting firm
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experiences if it produces a higher amount. As a consequence, it produces less,
thereby leaving a larger residual demand curve to the price setting firm which
in turn reacts by setting a higher price. Thus, as can be seen in Πpq, the profit
of the price setting firm increases in the size of the shock. This highlights that a
higher amount of uncertainty favors the choice of prices while a higher degree of
substitutability favors the choice of quantities.
This line of reasoning does not depend on the way we introduced uncertainty
in the demand system. If, for example, the demand system were pi = α − βθqi −
γθqj , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, the result would be the same. In that case the shock
would have no influence on expected profits if both firms set quantities but would
increase expected profits if both firms select prices.
Now we characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the two
stage game under uncertainty.
Proposition 1
The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the two-stage game under uncer-
tainty is the following:
Both firms select a quantity in the first stage if
z < zq(γ),
and at least one firm selects a quantity if z = zq(γ).
One firms selects a price and the other firm a quantity in the first stage if
zp(γ) > z > zq(γ),
and at most one firm selects a quantity if z = zp(γ).
Both firms select a price in the first stage if z > zp(γ).
Proof
From Lemma 1we know that if z > (<) zp(γ) a firm prefers to set a price (quantity)
conditional on the other firm selecting a price. If z = zp(γ) it is indifferent between
setting a price or a quantity.
Furthermore, if z > (<) zq(γ) a firm prefers to set a price (quantity) conditional
on the other firm selecting a quantity. If z = zq(γ) it is indifferent between setting
a price or a quantity.
Since zp(γ) > zq(γ) it follows from the above that for z < zq(γ) the unique
equilibrium involves both firms setting a quantity and for z = zq(γ) at least one
7
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Figure 2: Equilibrium outcome with one-dimensional uncertainty
firm sets a quantity. Moreover, for z > zp(γ) the unique equilibrium involves both
firms setting a price and for z = zp(γ) at least one firm sets a price. Now for
zp(γ) > z > zq(γ) firm i prefers to set a price conditional on firm j setting a quan-
tity while firm j prefers to set a quantity conditional on firm i setting a price. 
The equilibrium outcome of the gamewith one-dimensional uncertainty is dis-
played in Figure 2.
If uncertainty is high relative to the degree of substitution both firms select
prices while they both select quantities if the opposite holds true.7 But for any
γ there exists a range of z such that the unique equilibrium outcome is hybrid,
i.e. one firm charges a price and the other one sets a quantity. The intuition behind
this result is the following: For a given degree of substitutability, competition is the
fiercest if both firms charge prices while it is the softest when both set quantities.
As a consequence, the size of the shock that induces both firms to play the price
game must be strictly higher than the one that makes a firm indifferent between
setting a price and setting a quantity conditional on the other firm setting a quan-
tity. Thus, there always exists a range of z such that firms set different strategy
variables in equilibrium.
We have restricted our attention to the case in which products are substitutes
or independent, i.e. γ ≥ 0. Here we note briefly that if products are complements,
7If products are nearly perfect substitutes (γ → β), then zq(γ) → ∞ and quantities are the
preferred choice for every z.
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i.e. γ < 0, then it is a dominant strategy for both firms to set a price irrespective
of the degree of uncertainty. The reason for this result is that both the competition
and the uncertainty effect favor prices. Firstly, as Singh and Vives (1984) have
shown, if products are complements, setting prices is the dominant strategy in a
deterministic environment. Secondly, the relative advantage of setting a price with
respect to uncertainty is still present since this effect is independent of whether the
products are substitutes or complements.8
A possible limitation of our analysis is that we merely consider a linear de-
mand system. We do that for tractability reasons and to make our point as clear
as possible. Yet, our results are more general. The reason is the following: We
have demonstrated that whether uncertainty favors prices or quantities depends
on how the shock affects the residual demand curve of each firm. The central ques-
tion is how this residual demand curve would change in a more general demand
system. To this end, consider the case of a monopolist who faces the inverse de-
mand system p = f(q)
θ
with f ′(q) < 0. As pointed out by Reis (2006), the same line
of reasoning as in the case of a linear demand implies that the optimal choice of
a monopolist is to set a price. Now when looking at a duopoly model, the differ-
ence is that the competitor additionally affects the intercept of the residual demand
curve but leaves the advantage of prices unchanged. Thus, even with a general de-
mand system, as uncertainty increases, duopolists prefer to set prices rather than
quantities.
4 Two-Dimensional Uncertainty
So far we considered a shock affecting the slope of the demand curve. This implies
that a firm knows the range of consumers’ reservation prices but does not know
the distribution. In reality however, even the range of reservation prices might be
uncertain. In order to incorporate this aspect, we additionally consider a shock to
the intercept.
8The analysis with γ < 0 is straightforward since, as first pointed out by Sonnenschein (1968),
quantity (price) competition with substitutes is the dual to price (quantity) competition with com-
plements.
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Now the inverse demand system is given by
pi = α+ − β
θ
qi − γ
θ
qj, (3)
pj = α+ − β
θ
qj − γ
θ
qi, (4)
where  is a random variable.9 Without loss of generality we set E[] = 0. We
denote the covariance between the shocks by σθ.
Proceeding in the same way as before now yields equilibrium prices of
pi = pj =
(β − γ)(α+ σθ)
2β − γ
and expected equilibrium profits of
Πpp =
(α+ σθ)
2(β − γ)β
(β + γ)(2β − γ)2
in the case when both firms select a price as the strategy variable in the first stage.
If both firms choose a quantity, the equilibrium quantities are the same as in the
case of one-dimensional uncertainty and so the expected equilibrium profits are
also the same, namely
Πqq =
α2β
z(2β + γ)2
.
If firms select different strategy variables, the price setting firm sets
pi =
(β − γ)(2z(β + γ)(α+ σθ)− αγ)
4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2 ,
while the quantity setting firm chooses
qj =
α(2β − γ) + γσθ
4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2 .
As a consequence, the price setting firm receives an expected equilibrium profit of
Πpq =
(β − γ)2(2z(β + γ)(α+ σθ)− αγ)2
(4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2)2β ,
9We do not consider the case of a shock on the intercept alone. The reason is that  enters both
the inverse demand and the direct demand in a linear way. So this shock alone would cancel out,
and it would be a dominant action for both firms to set a quantity.
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while the quantity setting firm receives an expected equilibrium profit of
Πqp =
(β2 − γ2)z(α(2β − γ) + γσθ)2
(4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2)2β .
As before we restrict our attention to cases in which the support of the shocks is
such that realized prices and quantities are non-negative. As is evident from the
equilibrium prices and quantities, if the covariance is ’too’ negative, even the op-
timally chosen price or quantity becomes negative. Therefore we impose a lower
bound on σθ. This restriction stems from the equilibrium price of the price setting
firm in the hybrid equilibrium and is given by
σθ > −α
(
1− γ
2z(β + γ)
)
:= σˆθ(γ).
This ensures that all equilibrium prices and quantities are positive. Since we are
only concerned with cases in which the support is such that realized prices or
quantities are positive, σˆθ(γ) constitutes the lowest bound above which this is still
possible for a small enough support of the noise.10
As in the case of one-dimensional uncertainty, before proceeding to the first
stage we define ∆Πq(γ, σθ) := Πpq − Πqq and ∆Πp(γ, σθ) := Πpp − Πqp, where
∆Πq(γ, σθ) denotes the difference in expected profits of firm i if firm j chooses a
quantity in the first stage, while ∆Πp(γ, σθ) denotes the difference conditional on
firm j selecting a price. The following Lemma summarizes the technicalities we
need in order to derive the equilibrium.
Lemma 2
For any γ ∈ [0, β) there exists a unique σθ > σˆθ(γ), labeled σqθ(γ), such that
∆Πq(γ, σθ)

>
=
<
 0 if σθ

>
=
<
 σqθ(γ).
Moreover, there exists a unique γ+ ∈ (0, β), such that for any γ ∈ [0, γ+) there
10Moreover, a positive or not too negative correlation is the more realistic case. If some con-
sumers are willing to pay a high price for the good (positive shock on the intercept), it is likely that
the market becomes larger as well (positive shock on the slope). It is hard to imagine a market in
which a positive shock on the intercept is coupled with the expectation of a decreasing market size.
11
exists a unique σθ > σˆθ(γ), labeled σ
p
θ(γ), such that
∆Πp(γ, σθ)

>
=
<
 0 if σθ

>
=
<
 σpθ(γ).
For any γ ∈ (γ+, β), ∆Πp(γ, σθ) < 0 for all σθ > σˆθ(γ).
Finally σqθ(γ) > σ
p
θ(γ) for γ ∈ (0, β(1 − 1√z )), σqθ(γ) < σpθ(γ) for γ ∈ (β(1 −
1√
z
), γ+), and σqθ(γ) = σ
p
θ(γ) for γ ∈ {0, β(1− 1√z )}.
Proof. See Appendix.
Nowwe state the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the gamewith two-
dimensional uncertainty.
Proposition 2
If 0 < γ < β
(
1 − 1√
z
)
the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game with
two-dimensional uncertainty is the following:
Both firms select a quantity in the first stage if
σθ < σ
p
θ(γ).
Either both firms select a price or both firms select a quantity in first stage if
σqθ(γ) ≥ σθ ≥ σpθ(γ).
Both firms select a price in the first stage if
σθ > σ
q
θ(γ).
If γ > β
(
1− 1√
z
)
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the two-
stage-game with two-dimensional uncertainty is the following:
Both firms select a quantity in the first stage if
σθ < σ
q
θ(γ)
and at least one firm selects a quantity if σθ = σ
q
θ(γ).
One firm selects a price and the other firm selects a quantity if
σpθ(γ) > σθ > σ
q
θ(γ)
and at most one firm selects a quantity if σθ = σ
p
θ(γ).
Both firms select a price in the first stage if
σθ > σ
p
θ(γ).
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Figure 3: Equilibrium outcome with two-dimensional uncertainty
Proof
From Lemma 2 we know that if γ ∈ [0, γ+) a firm prefers to set a price (quan-
tity) conditional on the other firm selecting a price if σθ > (<) σ
p
θ(γ). If σθ =
σpθ(γ) it is indifferent between setting a price or a quantity.
Furthermore, if σθ > (<) σ
q
θ(γ) a firm prefers to set a price (quantity) condi-
tional on the other firm selecting a quantity. If σθ = σ
p
θ(γ) it is indifferent between
setting a price or a quantity.
Since σqθ(γ) > σ
p
θ(γ) for 0 < γ < β
(
1− 1√
z
)
, and σqθ(γ) < σ
p
θ(γ) for β
(
1− 1√
z
)
<
γ < γ+ the result follows from the above statements. 
The equilibrium outcome of the game with two-dimensional uncertainty is de-
picted in Figure 3.
This shows that for the case of a positive covariance the equilibrium outcome
is similar to the one with one-dimensional uncertainty. For the same reason as
before, the degree of competition and the amount of uncertainty have offsetting
effects on variable choice. In the following, we briefly discuss the main differences
that arise compared to the analysis without a shock on the intercept.
The first difference is that the parameters determining the choice of the strategy
variable are now the covariance of the shocks and the variance of the slope shock
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instead of the latter alone. The reason is that the interplay of the shocks is crucial
for the position of the residual demand curve. For example, if a firm selects a
price as its decision variable in the first stage, the interplay between the shocks
determines the quantity that it receives. Thus, the covariance enters its expected
profit and determines the strategy variable chosen in equilibrium.
The second difference is that now even for a low degree of competition both
firms select quantities if the shocks are sufficiently negatively correlated. With a
negative covariance, the shocks affect the slope and the intercept of the expected
demand function differently, i.e. if there is a positive shock on the intercept, a
steeper slope becomes more likely and vice versa. Thereby the interplay of the
shocks reduces the relative advantage of prices. Since the equilibrium profits in
the quantity setting game are not affected by the covariance, setting a price might
no longer be the preferred action even if uncertainty is high.
The third difference is that we get an equilibrium region in which either both
firms choose a quantity or both firms set a price if the degree of substitutability
is relatively small and the covariance is sufficiently negative. The reason for this
result is the following: It is easy to see that the equilibrium profits of a price set-
ting firm, i.e. Πpq and Πpp, increase in the covariance irrespective of the degree of
substitutability. In contrast, the equilibrium profit of a quantity setting firm de-
pends positively on the covariance if and only if its competitor sets a price and if
the degree of substitutability is positive.
In order to see that this generates multiple equilibria, we first consider the case
in which firm j sets a price and firm i is indifferent between setting a price or a
quantity. If γ increases, starting from γ = 0, Πqp and Πpp fall due to competition.
But there is an additional effect only on Πqp which stems from the fact that with a
positive degree of substitutability the covariance comes into play. Since σpθ(0) is
negative, this decreases Πqp further. Thus, in order to restore equality between Πqp
andΠpp, σpθ(γ)must decrease since the covariance has a larger impact on the profit
of the price setting firm.
Now suppose that firm j sets a quantity and that the degree of substitutability
increases starting from γ = 0. This decreases both Πpq and Πqq due to competi-
tion, with the latter decreasing relatively more than the former if the covariance is
sufficiently negative. In contrast to the first case, there is no additional effect stem-
ming from the interplay between the degree of substitutability and the covariance.
Thus, the difference between the profits from price and quantity setting is larger
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for firm i if firm j selects a price. As a consequence, the decrease in the covariance
that is needed in order to restore firm i’s indifference is larger in this case. Thus,
for relatively small degrees of substitutability, there exists a range of negative co-
variances such that the hybrid equilibrium does not exist because it is dominated
by the price-price and the quantity-quantity equilibrium.
As in the case of one-dimensional uncertainty, the intuition of our results car-
ries over to the case of a more general demand system, but with the qualification
that demand is not too concave. Consider again the monopoly case where demand
is given by p = f(q)
θ
+ θ, with f ′(q) < 0. Combining the results of Klemperer and
Meyer (1986) and Reis (2006) one can easily check that a monopolist prefers to set
a price if f(q) is convex or not too concave. By continuity reasons, this also holds
if the shocks to the slope and the intercept are not perfectly but still positively cor-
related. Since this result also applies to the residual demand curve of a duopolist,
uncertainty favors prices if demand is not too concave.
5 Conclusion
We show that the superiority of quantity competition for firms might no longer
hold if there is a substantial amount of uncertainty concerning demand conditions.
In the setting with a shock affecting the slope, we find that if uncertainty is high
relative to the degree of substitutability, firms prefer to set prices rather than quan-
tities. Moreover, for an intermediate range of uncertainty the unique equilibrium
outcome is that firms choose different strategy variables. We also demonstrate that
if there is a shock to the intercept and a shock to the slope, the important variable
determining themode of competition is the covariance between the shocks, but the
basic intuition from the analysis with one-dimensional uncertainty carries over to
this case. The paper provides the testable implication that if firms have some de-
gree of freedom to choose their strategy variable, they should tend to choose quan-
tities in industries with relatively stable and certain demand, but choose prices if
demand is fluctuating and uncertain.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Existence and Uniqueness of zq(γ) and zp(γ)
First, we show existence and uniqueness of zq(γ) and zp(γ) for any γ ∈ (0, β).
The profit functions are rational functions defined on the domain γ ∈ [0, β), z > 1. Thus,
∆Πq(γ, z) and∆Πp(γ, z) are continuous in γ and z and at least once continuously differentiable.
For arbitrary γ ∈ (0, β),
lim
z→1
∆Πq(γ, z) =
α2γ3(6γ2β − 8β3 + γ3)
(4β2 − 3γ2)2β(2β + γ)2 < 0,
and
lim
z→∞∆Π
q(γ, z) =
α2
4β
> 0.
Since
∂∆Πq(γ, z)
∂z
=
4α2(β − γ)2(2z(β + γ)− γ)(γ + β)γ(2β − γ)
(4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2)3β +
α2β
(2β + γ)2z2
> 0, (5)
we have shown that zq(γ) exists and that it is unique. An immediate consequence of this and the
facts that limz→1∆Πq(γ, z) < 0 and limz→∞∆Πq(γ, z) > 0 is that∆Πq(γ, z) T 0 if z T zq(γ).
Now we turn to the existence and uniqueness of zp(γ). For an arbitrary γ ∈ (0, β)
lim
z→1
∆Πp(γ, z) = − (β − γ)α
2γ3(8β3 − 6γ2β + γ3)
(β + γ)(2β − γ)2(4β2 − 3γ2)2β < 0,
and
lim
z→∞∆Π
p(γ, z) =
β(β − γ)α2
(β + γ)(2β − γ)2 > 0.
Since
∂∆Πp(γ, z)
∂z
=
α2(2β − γ)2(β2 − γ2)(4z(β2 − γ2)− γ2)
(4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2)3β , (6)
which is negative for z < z˜(γ) := γ
2
4(β2−γ2) and positive for z > z˜(γ), we have shown that for
every γ there exists a unique zp(γ) > z˜(γ). Combining the uniqueness of zp(γ) with the facts that
limz→1∆Πp(γ, z) < 0 and limz→∞∆Πp(γ, z) > 0 yields∆Πp(γ, z) T 0 if z T zp(γ).
If γ → 0, then
lim
γ→0
∆Πq(γ, z) =
α2(z − 1)
4βz
and
lim
γ→0
∆Πp(γ, z) =
α2(z − 1)
4βz
.
Thus, for γ → 0, zq(γ)→ 1 and zp(γ)→ 1.
Characterization of zq(γ) and zp(γ)
In the following we show that ∂z
q(γ)
∂γ > 0 and
∂zp(γ)
∂γ > 0. This is done via the Implicit Function
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Theorem.11
We already know that (5) is globally strictly positive. So it is also strictly positive when evalu-
ated at zq(γ). Thus, ∂∆Π
q(γ,z)
∂z
∣∣∣
z=zq(γ)
> 0.
In the following, we show that the derivative of ∆Πq(γ, z) with respect to γ is negative if it is
evaluated at zq(γ).
Differentiating∆Πq(γ, z)with respect to γ yields
−2α
2(β − γ)(2z(β + γ)− γ)(4z(β2 − γβ + γ2)− γ2)
(4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2)3 +
α2β
(2β + γ)3z
.
Evaluating ∂∆Π
q(γ,z)
∂γ at z
q(γ) yields
2α2(β − γ)(2z′(β + γ)− γ)
(4z′(β2 − γ2) + γ2)3β(2β + γ) φ(γ, z
q(γ)) (7)
with
φ(γ, z) = 8(β2 − γ2)2z2 + 2(β2γ2 − 4β4 − 3γ4)z + γ2(γ2 + 2β2).
Since the first factor of (7) is strictly bigger than zero, the sign of the derivative is determined
by the sign of φ(γ, z) at zq(γ). Since φ(γ, z) is a quadratic function in z with a positive leading term,
it is convex and has two real roots. The one that involves values of z > 1 is denoted by zˆ(γ), where
zˆ(γ) =
4β4 − β2γ2 + 3γ4 +√χ(γ)
8(β2 − γ2)2 ,
with
χ(γ) = 49β4γ4 − 24β6γ2 − 6β2γ6 + 16β8 + γ8.
It can be shown that χ(0) and χ(β) are strictly positive. Furthermore, for γ ∈ (0, β), χ(γ) attains its
minimum value, 13β8, at γ ≈ β2 . Thus zˆ(γ) is well defined.
In the following, we compare zˆ(γ) with zq(γ) and use the fact that ∆Πq(γ, zq(γ)) = 0. Evalu-
ating∆Πq(γ, z) at an arbitrary γ ∈ (0, β) and the corresponding zˆ(γ) yields
∆Πq(γ, zˆ(γ)) =
(4γ3β − γ4 + 3γ2β2 − 4γβ3 + 4β4 +√χ(γ))2α2
4β(4β4 + γ2β2 + γ4 +
√
χ(γ))2
− 8α
2β(β2 − γ2)2
(2β + γ)2(4β4 − γ2β2 + 3γ4 +√χ(γ)) .
To see that ∆Πq(γ, zˆ(γ)) > 0 for all γ ∈ (0, β) we rewrite the right hand side of the previous
equation as
γ2ϕ1(γ)
(√
χ(γ)(36β6γ2 + 40γ3β5 + 47β4γ4 + 96β8 + 64γβ7 + 40γ5β3 + 2β2γ6 − γ8)
+960γ4β8 + 123γ8β4 + 24γ9β3 + γ12 + ϕ2(γ)− ϕ3(γ)
)
11In principle, we could solve for zq(γ) and zp(γ) explicitly. However, the expressions involved in determining the sign
of the derivatives are hardly accessible. Thus, to prove the result we use the Implicit Function Theorem for the sake of
exposition.
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with
ϕ1(γ) =
4α2
β(γ4 + β2γ2 + 4β4 +
√
χ(γ))2(2β + γ)2(4β4 − β2γ2 + 3γ4 +√χ(γ)) > 0,
ϕ2(γ) = 600β7γ5 + 80β5γ7 + 256β11γ + 384β12 > 0,
ϕ3(γ) = 127β6γ6 + 21β2γ10 + 240β10γ2 + 96β9γ3 ≥ 0.
Obviously γ = 0 is one of the roots of∆Πq(γ, zˆ(γ)). Now we need to show that it has none for
γ ∈ (0, β). Since
ϕ2(γ) > 127β7γ5 + 21β5γ7 + 240β11γ + 96β12 > ϕ3(γ),
for γ ∈ (0, β), we have shown that∆Πq(γ, zˆ(γ)) has no real root for γ ∈ (0, β). Thus,∆Πq(γ, zˆ(γ)) >
0 for all γ ∈ (0, β). As ∆Πq(γ, z) is increasing in z, zq(γ) < zˆ(γ) for every γ ∈ (0, β). Thus,
φ(γ, zq(γ)) < 0 and thereby the derivative of ∆Πq(γ, zq(γ))with respect to γ is negative.
Since ∆Πqγ(γ, zq(γ)) < 0 and ∆Πqz(γ, zq(γ)) > 0 for γ ∈ (0, β), the Implicit Function Theorem
implies that
dzq(γ)
dγ
= −∆Π
q
γ(γ, z
q(γ))
∆Πqz(γ, zq(γ))
> 0.
Now we turn to the function ∆Πp(γ, z) = 0. If (6) is evaluated at zp(γ) it is strictly positive,
since zp(γ) > z˜(γ). Thus, ∂∆Π
p(γ,z)
∂z
∣∣∣
z=zp(γ)
> 0.
In the following, we show that ∂∆Π
p(γ,z)
∂γ
∣∣∣
z=zp(γ)
< 0. Differentiating∆Πp(γ, z)with respect to
γ yields:
2α2
(
(2β − γ)z(4z(β3 − 2β2γ − βγ2 + 2γ3)− γ(2γ2 + βγ + 4β2))
(4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2)3 −
β(β2 − γβ + γ2)
(β + γ)2(2β − γ)3
)
.
Evaluating ∂∆Π
p(γ,z)
∂γ at z
p(γ) yields:
2α2(2β − γ)(β + γ)γ
(4z′′(γ)(β2 − γ2) + γ2)3β ψ(γ, z
p(γ)), (8)
with
ψ(γ, z) = (4z − 1)(6β − γ)γ − (5z − 1)4β2.
Since the first factor in (8) is bigger than zero for all γ ∈ (0, β), the sign of this derivative is negative
if ψ(γ, zp(γ)) is negative.
In order to check the sign of ψ(γ, zp(γ)), we solve∆Πp(γ, zp(γ)) = 0 to obtain
zp(γ) =
κ(γ) + 8β2γ2(β − γ) + (2β − γ)2√κ(γ)√β + γ
32β2(β − γ)2(β + γ) (9)
with
κ(γ) = 16β5 − 8β2γ(2β2 + 3βγ − 4γ2)− γ4(7β − γ).
Obviously, κ(0) and κ(β) are strictly positive. Moreover, for γ ∈ (0, β) this expression attains its
minimum at γ ≈ 0.88β. Evaluating κ(γ) at this value yields 1.47β5. Thus, κ(γ) > 0.
Inserting zp(γ) into ψ(γ, z) yields:
− (2β − γ)
8(β2 − γ2)β2
(
24β5 + 31β2γ3 + γ5 − 2γβ(6β3 + 13β2γ + 5γ3)
+ (5β − γ)(2β − γ)
√
κ(γ)
√
β + γ
)
.
18
Since
24β5 + 31β2γ3 + γ5 − 2γβ(6β3 + 13β2γ + 5γ3) > κ(γ) > 0,
ψ(γ, zp(γ)) and ∂∆Π
p(γ,z)
∂γ
∣∣∣
z=zp(γ)
are negative.
The Implicit Function Theorem implies that
dzp(γ)
dγ
= −∆Π
p
γ(γ, z
p(γ))
∆Πpz(γ, zp(γ))
> 0.
Relation of zq(γ) and zp(γ)
Consider an arbitrary γ ∈ (0, β) and the associated zp(γ). Evaluating ∆Πq(γ, z) at that zp(γ)
yields:
4α2γ2(2β − γ)2
β(2β + γ)2
λ1(γ)
(√
κ(γ)
√
β + γ(2β − γ)λ2(γ) + λ3(γ)
)
(10)
with
λ1(γ) =
(
(16β3(β2 − βγ − γ2) + γ3(24β2 − 7γβ + γ2) + (2β − γ)2
√
κ(γ)
√
β + γ)
(8β3(2β2 − 2βγ − γ2) + γ3(16β2 − 7γβ + γ2) + (2β − γ)2
√
κ(γ)
√
β + γ)2
)−1
,
λ2(γ) = (288β7 − 304β6γ − 176β5γ2 + 304β4γ3 − 70β3γ4 − 13β2γ5 + 8βγ6 − γ7),
and
λ3(γ) = γ11 − 13βγ10 + 67β2γ9 − 95β3γ8 − 592β4γ7 + 2832β5γ6 − 3536β6γ5
− 1920β7γ4 + 7168β8γ3 − 3072β9γ2 − 2560β10γ + 1792β11.
Now we need to determine the sign of λ1(γ), λ2(γ), and λ3(γ). Since
16β3(β2 − βγ − γ2) + γ3(24β2 − 7γβ + γ2) ≥ κ(γ) > 0 and
(8β3(2β2 − 2βγ − γ2) + γ3(16β2 − 7γβ + γ2) ≥ κ(γ) > 0,
λ1(γ) is strictly bigger than zero.
It can be shown that λ2(γ) and λ3(γ) have no root in (0, β). Since λ2
(
β
2
)
≈ 125β7 > 0 and
λ3
(
β
2
)
≈ 449β11 > 0, both expressions are strictly bigger than zero. This implies that (10) is bigger
than zero. Since ∆Πq(γ, z) is increasing in its second argument, zq(γ) has to be smaller than zp(γ)
in order for this condition to hold. 
6.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Existence and Uniqueness of σqθ(γ) and σ
p
θ(γ)
First, consider the case in which firm j sets a quantity. Firm i is indifferent between setting a
price or a quantity if
(β − γ)2(2z(β + γ)(α+ σθ)− αγ)2
(4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2)2β =
α2β
z(2β + γ)2
. (11)
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The solutions of (11) are
σ
(1)
θ (γ) =
α(
√
zβ(4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2)− z(2β + γ)(β − γ)(2z(β + γ)− γ))
2z2(β2 − γ2)(2β + γ) ,
σ
(2)
θ (γ) = −
α(
√
zβ(4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2)− z(2β + γ)(β − γ)(2z(β + γ)− γ))
2z2(β2 − γ2)(2β + γ) .
We have to check how σ(1)θ (γ) and σ
(2)
θ (γ) relate to σˆθ(γ). In order to do that we simply
subtract σˆθ(γ) from both threshold covariances. It turns out that σ
(1)
θ (γ)−σˆθ(γ) = ∆, and σ(2)θ (γ)−
σˆθ(γ) = −∆, where ∆ is given by
α(
√
zβ(4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2)
2z2(β2 − γ2)(2β + γ) > 0.
Thus, σ(2)θ (γ) is never in the admissible range of σθ while σ
(1)
θ (γ) is. We denote σ
(1)
θ (γ) by σ
q
θ(γ).
Now we have to determine under which conditions firm i prefers to set a price or a quantity
conditional on firm j choosing a quantity. Comparing Πpq with Πqq it is easy to see that firm i sets
a price if σθ(γ) > σ
q
θ(γ) since Π
pq is increasing in σθ(γ)while Πqq is independent of σθ(γ). Thus,
∆Πq(γ, σθ) T 0 if σθ T σqθ(γ).
Now suppose firm j sets a price. Then, firm i is indifferent between choosing a price or a
quantity if
(α+ σθ)2(β − γ)β
(β + γ)(2β − γ)2 =
(β2 − γ2)z(α(2β − γ) + γσθ)2
(4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2)2β . (12)
The solutions of (12) are
σ˜
(1)
θ (γ) =
α
√
z(β2 − γ2)(2β − γ)
h(γ)
(
2
√
zγ(β + γ) + β(4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2)
)
− α,
σ˜
(2)
θ (γ) =
α
√
z(β2 − γ2)(2β − γ)
h(γ)
(
2
√
zγ(β + γ)− β(4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2)
)
− α
with
h(γ) := 16β2(β2 − γ2)2z2 + γ2(β + γ)(4β3 − 8β2γ + 3βγ2 − γ3)z + β2γ4.
It is easy to show that h(0) = 16z2β6 > 0, h(β) = β6(1 − 4z) < 0, and ∂h(γ)∂γ < 0. This implies
that there exists a unique γ ∈ (0, β), labeled γ+, that solves h(γ) = 0. Thus, σ˜(1)θ (γ) and σ˜(2)θ (γ) are
defined on γ ∈ [0, β) \ {γ+}.
Now we analyze how σ˜(1)θ (γ) relates to σˆθ(γ). Subtracting the latter from the former yields
α(4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2)
2z(β + γ)h(γ)
(
(4z
3
2 (β+γ)β(2β−γ)(β2−γ2)+γ2(2zβ(2β2−γ2)+β2γ(z−1)+zγ3)
)
. (13)
The numerator of (13) is nonnegative for all γ ∈ [0, β) while the sign of the denominator depends
on the sign of h(γ). The argument above implies that h(γ) > 0 for γ ∈ [0, γ+) and h(γ) < 0 for
γ ∈ (γ+, β). As a consequence, we have σ˜(1)θ (γ) > σˆθ(γ) if and only if γ < γ+.
Now we investigate the relation between σ˜(2)θ (γ) and σˆθ(γ). Subtracting the minimum of the
latter (−α) from the former yields
α
√
z(β2 − γ2)(2β − γ)
h(γ)
(
2
√
zγ(β + γ)− β(4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2)
)
.
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This expression is equal to zero for γ = β and smaller than zero for all γ ∈ [0, β).12 Thus, σ˜(2)θ (γ) is
never in the admissible range of σθ. For every γ ∈ [0, γ+)we denote σ˜(1)θ (γ) by σpθ(γ).
Now we show that firm i prefers to set a price contingent on firm j choosing a price if σθ >
σpθ(γ). Firm i sets a price if Π
pp is bigger than Πqp. Differentiating ∆Πp(γ, σθ) with respect to σθ,
and evaluating this difference at ∆Πp(γ, σθ) = 0 yields
∂(Πpp −Πqp)
∂σθ
∣∣∣
∆Πp(γ,σθ)=0
=
4
√
zα(β − γ)2
(2β − γ)(4z(β2 − γ2) + γ2) > 0.
This implies that at σpθ(γ) firm i’s marginal benefit from an increase in the covariance is bigger if it
selects a price than if it chooses a quantity. Thus, ∆Πp(γ, σθ) T 0 if σθ T σpθ(γ).
Finally, for γ ∈ (γ+, β] there exists no σθ > σˆθ such that (12) holds. As a consequence, the
right hand side of (12) is bigger than the left hand side and so ∆Πp(γ, σθ) < 0 for any γ ∈ (γ+, β].
Relation of σqθ(γ) and σ
p
θ(γ)
In the following we determine how σqθ(γ) and σ
p
θ(γ) relate to each other. It is easy to check
that at γ = 0, σqθ(0) = σ
p
θ(0) = −α
(
1 − 1√
z
)
. Subtracting σpθ(γ) from σ
q
θ(γ) reveals that there
exists a unique γ ∈ (0, β), namely γ = β
(
1− 1√
z
)
, for which both threshold covariances are equal.
It remains to show that σqθ(γ) and σ
p
θ(γ) cross at γ = β
(
1 − 1√
z
)
. Differentiating σqθ(γ) with
respect to γ and evaluating the derivative at the intersection point yields
α
(
1− 3√z − 3z + 15z 32 − 10z2
)
2β
√
z
(
2
√
z − 1
)2(
3
√
z − 1
)2 , (14)
while differentiating σpθ(γ)with respect to γ and evaluating the derivative at the intersection point
yields
α
(
1− 7√z + 13z + 25z 32 − 128z2 + 106z 52 + 251z3 − 523z 72 + 101z4 + 491z 92 − 430z5 + 100z 112
)
2βz
3
2
(
15z2 − 11z 32 − 4z + 5√z − 1
)2 .
(15)
Since z > 1 it is easy to check that (15) is strictly bigger than (14). This shows that at the
intersection point σpθ(γ) crosses σ
q
θ(γ) from below and so σ
p
θ(γ) < σ
q
θ(γ) for 0 < γ < β
(
1 − 1√
z
)
and σpθ(γ) > σ
q
θ(γ) for β
(
1− 1√
z
)
< γ < γ+. 
12Here both the numerator and the denominator are zero at γ = γ+, and one can show by using the Rule of L’Hospital
that the expression is negative at γ = γ+.
21
References
• K. Aiginger, 1999, The Use of Game Theoretical Models for Empirical Indus-
trial Organization, in: D.C. Mueller, A. Haid and J. Weigand, eds., Competi-
tion, Efficiency, andWelfare - Essays in Honor ofManfredNeumann. Kluwer
Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 253-277.
• J. Bertrand, 1883, Revue de la Theorie Mathematique de la Richesse Sociale
et Recherches sur les Principes Mathematiques de la Theories des Richesses,
Journal des Savants, 499-508.
• L. Cheng, 1985, Comparing Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria: A Geometric
Approach, RAND Journal of Economics 16, 146-152.
• A. Cournot, 1838, Recherches sur les Principes Mathematiques de la Theorie
des Richesses, L. Hachette, Paris, France.
• P. Klemperer and M. Meyer, 1986, Price Competition vs. Quantity Compe-
tition: The Role of Uncertainty, RAND Journal of Economics 17, 618-638.
• R. Reis, 2006, Inattentive Producers, Review of Economic Studies 73, 793-
821.
• N. Singh and X. Vives, 1984, Price and Quantity Competition in a Differen-
tiated Duopoly, RAND Journal of Economics 15, 546-554.
• H. Sonnenschein, 1968, The Dual of Duopoly is Complementary Monopoly:
or, Two of Cournot’s Theories are One, Journal of Political Economy 76, 316-
318.
• Y. Tanaka, 2001, Profitability of Price andQuantity Strategies in anOligopoly,
Journal of Mathematical Economics 35, 409-418.
• A. Tasnadi, 2006, Price vs. Quantity in Oligopoly Games, International Jour-
nal of Industrial Organization 24, 541-554.
• M. Weitzman, 1974, Prices vs. Quantities, Review of Economic Studies 41,
477-491.
22
